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Abstract 
           This article derives a simple method for projecting pension deficit as percent of 
GDP in future years based on commonly available population forecasting and a few 
predictable economic and policy variables. Compared with the classic basic equilibrium 
equation of pension funds, our new formula decomposes the retirees-workers ratio which 
mixes various kinds of impacts into three more-easily-predictable variables – the elderly 
dependent ratio, the prevalence of pension coverage, and the employment rate. Our 
illustrative application to China shows that gradually increasing the current low minimum 
age of retirement will largely reduce the pension deficit, under various demographic 
regimes. The pension deficit as % of GDP in the low fertility scenarios (which 
corresponds with keeping the current rigid fertility control policy unchanged in the long-
run) would be 5.6-11.1, 3.8-6.3, and 9.0-13.8 times as high as that in the Medium 
Fertility & Medium Mortality scenarios in 2040, 2060, and 2080.   
 
 
Introduction          
Policymakers, the public, economic demographers, and economists, in general are 
very much concerned about the possible impacts of population aging on pension deficit 
as percent of GDP, which are likely the consequence of the relatively rapid growth of   2
retirees and  the shrinking of the working age population. Various models have been 
developed to project the pension deficit by academic scholars and governmental agencies 
in recent decades. For example, the World Bank’s Pension Reform Options Simulation 
Tool-kit (PROST) is probably the most advanced and widely applied model that uses the 
actuarial method to project pension deficits. While it has ability to project the pension 
system’s expenditure and revenues, the PROST model can also be used for other 
purposes, such as making pension system choices, modifying system rules, and 
determining appropriate contribution rates under different demographic and economic 
assumptions (World Bank 2002; Becker and Paltsev 2001). At present, there are more 
than 80 countries using the PROST model and software for their pension project and/or 
analysis. Using the PROST approach, Sin (2005) projected pension fund deficits in China 
under fourteen different scenarios in addition to addressing pension system choices, 
minimum age of retirement, and coverage options. Becker and Paltsev (2001) proposed a 
similar actuarial model as the PROST for a transitional country- Kyrgyz republic. They 
assessed the future trend of pension fund deficits under six scenarios with different 
demographic change and economic growth possibilities while focusing on alternative 
pension system options and a raise of minimum age of retirement.  
Generally speaking, a typical actuarial model for pension deficit projections 
contains population, labor, pension, and macroeconomic modules (Becker and Paltsev 
2001).  Normally, the existing actuarial models need the following data in baseline year 
and each forecasted year: age-sex-specific data on fertility, mortality, immigration, labor 
force participation rates, unemployment rates, earnings profiles, contributors and 
pensioners, years of employment services at retirement, pension payments, retirement   3
rates
1, and some non-age-specific macroeconomic indicators, such as GDP and its growth 
rate, and replacement rates (Becker and Paltsev 2001; Sin 2005). Some economic/finance 
forecasting models may also need age-sex-specific disability, survivor, and evasion and 
exemption rates (Becker and Paltsev 2001).  Age-sex-specific data could provide more 
accurate information about the pensioner and contributors to the pension system given 
that the large differentials exist between males and females at different ages. However, 
such a large data requirement may not be met in developing and transitional countries, 
and it is extremely difficult to get needed good data for those decentralized systems that 
are run locally with different components and requirements.  For example, a well-
supported and well-organized World Bank study on China’s pension system reform and 
projection only used data from seven provinces and local municipalities to project 
pension fund deficits, which might not accurately represent the whole country (Sin 2005). 
Becker and Paltsev (2001 indicated that the main purpose of the projection models for the 
pension fund deficits in transitional countries is illustrative rather than being intended for 
accurate revenue and expenditure forecasting, given that most transitional countries lack 
an adequate database to obtain robust results. 
Another disadvantage of existing pension projections in transitional economies is 
that insufficient attention was paid to the demographics of possible changes in fertility, 
mortality, and migration (Becker and Bloom 1998). Empirical studies have shown that 
neglecting such demographic dynamics would create biases for pension fund balance 
projections (Becker and Paltsev 2001).  
            Moreover, complicated actuarial models require special expertise and skills and 
not easily accessible and understandable by the demographers and ordinary readers who   4
are interested in exploring the impacts of possible changes in fertility, mortality and 
minimum age of retirement policies. Thus, developing a simple method for estimating the 
demographic, policy, and economic impacts on pension deficit as percent of GDP is of 
scientific and practical significance, which is the goal of this article.  We will first derive 
a simple method for projecting pension deficit as percent of GDP based on a few macro 
economic and policy variables and commonly available existing population forecasting 
which depends on future changes in fertility, mortality, and migration. We will then apply 
this general method to the case of China and present comparative analyses between eight 
scenarios with different assumptions of fertility, mortality and minimum age of 
retirements to explore how may changes in fertility, mortality and policy concerning 
minimum age of retirement affects pension deficit as percent of GDP in China, the largest 
population in the world.  
 
Derivation of a Simple Method for Projecting Pension deficit as percent of GDP 
    Let  () Wt denote the total number of workers; the term of “workers” in this article 
refers to those who work and participate in a pension program. 
() R t , total number of retirees in year t; the term “retirees” in this article refers to those 
who are retired and receive pension benefits. 
() dt, retiree-worker ratio in year t, namely, the ratio of total number of retirees to total 








() AW t , average wage per worker in year t;   5
() P t , pension premium contribution rate in year t, namely, the proportion of total 
contributions to the pension fund premium by workers and employers among the total 
wages of all workers in year t;  
() B t , replacement rate in year t, namely, the ratio of the average retirement wage per 
retiree to the average wage per worker in year t;  
If the total amount of the pension fund premium contributions by workers and 
employers is equal to the total pension payment to the retirees in year t, the following 
equation is held:  
( ) [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] ( ) P tA W t W t B t A W tR t ⋅⋅ = ⋅⋅        
Dividing both sides of the above equation by () () AW t W t ⋅ , we get:   
() () () P tB t d t =⋅        ( 1 )  
The above equation (1) is the classic basic equilibrium equation of pension funds 
(e.g., Becker and Paltsev 2001:19; Zhuo 2001; Cairns 2004; Hamayon and Legros 2001; 
Sin 2005). Based on this classic equation, we further derive a new simple method for 
projecting pension deficit as percent of GDP as follows. 
Denote n(t) as the ratio of pension deficit (i.e. the difference between total pension 
premium contributions by workers and employers and the total pension payments to 
retirees) to the total wages in year t. n(t) can be positive (pension fund deficit), zero 
(balanced), or negative (pension fund surplus). The following equation is held: 
()[ () () ] () () () [ () () ] () P t A Wt Wt nt A Wt Wt Bt A Wt Rt ⋅⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅⋅  
Dividing the both sides of the above equation by () () AW t W t ⋅ , we get:   
() () () () P tn tB t d t +=⋅ 
() () () () nt Bt dt Pt =⋅−                      (2)                      6
Note that the retirees-workers ratio (d(t)) in above equation (2) mixes the impacts of 
demographics, prevalence of pension coverage, and economic performance, which makes 
it extremely difficult to predict d(t) into the future years. Thus, we intend to express d(t) 
by a couple of more-easily-predictable variables. Let  2() dt  denote the dependency ratio 
of elderly over minimum age of retirement, namely, the ratio of the total number of 
elderly persons over the minimum age of retirement to the total number of persons of 
labor force age (e.g. from age 18 to the minimum age of retirement).  2() dt can be derived 
from commonly available existing population forecasting. However, because not all 
persons over the minimum age of retirement are retired and receive pensions and not all 
persons of labor force age work for wages and participate in pension program,  2() dt  and 
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Let r(t) denote the retirement rate (i.e., proportion of retirees who receive pensions among 
the total number of elderly persons over the minimum age of retirement) which is the   7
numerator on the right side of above equation; e(t), the formal employment rate (i.e., 
proportion of the workers who participated in pension programs among the total number 
of persons of labor force ages) which is the denominator on the right side of above 
equation. Thus,  
2
()
() () () ()
()
rt
nt Bt d t Pt
et
=⋅ −         ( 3 )  
We go one-step further to estimate PD(t), the conventional index of pension deficit 
as percent of GDP, through multiplying n(t) by SG(T), the total wages as percent of GDP: 
2
()
() [ () () () ] ()
()
rt
PDt Bt d t Pt S Gt
et
=⋅ −       ( 4 )    
Eq. (4) has provided a simple and practical approach for projecting pension deficit 
as percent of GDP in the future years, based on:  
(a) One demographic indicator (also reflecting the policy on minimum age of retirement) 
--  2() dt  (dependent ratio of elderly over minimum age of retirement);  
(b) Two pension policy indicators -- () B t (replacement rate) and () P t (pension premium 
contribution rate), and one summary indicator of social welfare policy on the prevalence 
of pension coverage, including the extent of postponement of retirement -- r(t) (the 
retirement rate);   
(c) One economic performance indicator -- e(t) (the formal employment rate) and another 
economic variable SG(t), total wages as percent of GDP.  
           Note  that  2() dt  has clear demographic and policy meanings and can be easily 
derived from commonly available existing population forecasting; B(t), P(t), and r(t) have 
clear policy meanings; e(t) and SG(t) have clear economic meanings; B(t), P(t), r(t), e(t), 
and SG(t) can be projected based on time series analysis or policy analysis with   8
comparison with other populations at different stages of economic development or the 
expert option approach. Note that the retirees-workers ratio (d(t)) in the classic basic 
equilibrium equation of pension fund (Eq. (1)) mixes the impacts of demographics, 
prevalence of pension coverage, and economic performance, which makes it extremely 
difficult to predict d(t) into the future years. Our new Eq. (4) decomposes the hardly-
predictable d(t) into three more-easily-predictable variables --   2() dt  (dependent ratio of 
elderly over minimum age of retirement), r(t) (prevalence of pension coverage) and e(t) 
(economic performance). Of course we should be aware that the demographic factor d2(t), 
policy factors B(t), P(t), and r(t), and the economic factors e(t) and SG(t) in Eq. (4) are all 
interactive with each other, and our simple method cannot identify the interaction effects. 
          In  fact,  if  one  believes  that  ratio of pension deficit to the total wage (n(t)) is 
sufficient to measure the pension financial gap, one may use simpler Eq. (3) to estimate 
n(x) as indicator of pension shortage. We, however, recommend using Eq. (4) to project 
pension deficit as percent of GDP since it is more directly intuitive to express the pension 
financial gap, and that the additional input of total wages as percent of GDP is usually 
available in the time series data set, rather stable, and relatively easy to predict.     
 If the main purpose of the study is to analyze the impact of changes in demographic 
regimes (i.e. fertility and mortality levels) and policy of minimum age of retirement on 
the pension deficit as percent of GDP in the future years, one may simply fix the changes 
(or no changes) of policies on pension benefits and premium contribution rates (B(t) and 
P(t)), social welfare and postponement of retirement (r(t)) and economic performance 
(e(t)), while focusing on scenarios with various combinations of different assumptions on 
changes in fertility, mortality and minimum age of retirement.    9
 
Illustrative application: the impacts of possible changes in fertility, mortality, and 
minimum age of retirement on pension deficit as percent of GDP in 2000-2080 in 
China 
 
Data and assumptions for the scenarios  
        According to the statistics released by the China Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security, the replacement rate in 2000 (B(2000)) was 0.8789，the pension premium 
contribution rate in 2000 (P(2000)) was 0.1821. We adopt the research results on the 
forecasting of the replacement rate up to 2030 (B(2030) = 0.60) and the pension premium 
contribution rate up to 2050 (P(2050) = 0.36, (with 0.25 contributed by employees and 
0.11 contributed by individual workers), released by the Institute of Social Security under 
the China Ministry of Labor and Social Security (He, 1998; 2001). The replacement rates 
between 2000 and 2030 and the pension premium contribution rates between 2000 and 
2050 are estimated by linear interpretation. The replacement rates after 2030 and the 
pension premium contribution rates after 2050 are assumed to be unchanged. We 
employed the average of the high and low scenarios of the real annual growth rate of 
GDP and real annual growth rate of total wages from year 2000 to 2075 (Shin 2005) and 
then estimated the annual total wages as percent of GDP and GDP  from 2000 to 2080.              
           Although  the  retirement  rates (r(t)) and formal employment rate (e(t)) are 
predictable, it is very hard to do it in China so far because of the lack of time series data 
of good quality, and future uncertainties concerning economic performance and social 
welfare policy, such as whether and when the basic pension system may be implemented   10
in rural areas. Even more importantly, the focus of our illustrative application to the new 
simple method in this paper is to analyze the impacts of possible changes in fertility and 
mortality levels and the policy of minimum age of retirement on the pension deficit as 





 in Eq. (2) 
after year 2000 remains the same as what was observed in 2000.   
       The medium mortality scenario adopted in this study assumes that there will be 
rather gradual progress in reducing mortality in China during the first half of this century 
– from a life expectancy of 71.4 years for both sexes combined in 2000, to 78.1 in 2050, 
and 81.9 in 2080. This may be quite conservative; given the fact that life expectancy in 
Japan in 2003 was already 81.8 years
2. Some recent research indicates that there might be 
a significant improvement in mortality in the first half of this century, because of 
biomedical advances and breakthroughs, and better personal health practices, such as 
healthy diets, not-smoking and exercise, etc. We, therefore, made another optimistic 
scenario, namely, life expectancy for both sexes combined was assumed to approach 84.8 
in 2050 (Ogawa 1988), a level that is about 3 years higher than that in Japan in 2003. We 
also assume that life expectancy for the two sexes combined will be 88 years old in 
2080
3. This optimistic mortality scenario is subject to uncertainty, but we believe that it is 
not impossible. Some scholars thought that a life expectancy of 85 years represented the 
limit of human life expectancy (e.g. Fries et al. 1989; Olshansky et al., 1990; Olshansky 
Carnes, and Désesquelles 2001). However, most scholars now think that human beings 
can, on average, live much longer than 85 years (e.g. Manton et al. 1991; Vaupel and 
Gowan 1986; Guralnik et al. 1988; Vaupel et al. 1998; Oeppen and Vaupel 2002).   11
Despite uncertainty, the conservative and optimistic mortality scenarios bracket an 
informative range of possibilities in China during the first half of the next century.  
The 2000 Chinese census reported an extremely low TFR of 1.22. This is 
obviously too low to believe.  Based on our review of existing related studies (e.g. Guo, 
2000), we assume a 25% under-reporting of birth rates, which implies that the TFR for 
rural and urban areas combined in 2000 was about 1.63; and the TFR in rural and urban 
areas was estimated as 1.9 and 1.15 in 2000
4. In the low fertility scenario, we assume that 
the TFR will slightly increase from the 2000 level to 1.98 and 1.2 in rural and urban areas 
in 2012, and then remain constant (see Table 1). This low fertility assumption may reflect 
the implications of keeping the current extremely rigid fertility policy unchanged in the 
long run.  In the medium fertility scenario, we expect that China will gradually relax its 
one-child policy, due to the current very low fertility level and the future population 
aging problems
5. Thus, in the medium fertility scenario, we assume that the life-time 
cohort TFR will increase to 2.27 and 1.8 in rural and urban areas in 2012, and keep at this 
level afterward
6. Because rapid socioeconomic development in China has been causing 
young people to delay their marriages and births (see data shown in Figure 1 of Zeng et 
al., 2005), we assume that the age at the first, second or higher order births will increase 
by 0.9 and 1.8 years during the years from 2012 to 2030, which constitutes an annual 
growth rate of 0.05 and 0.1 years, respectively. According to the Bongaarts-Feeney 
method (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998; Zeng and Land 2000; 2001), the projected period 
TFR of the first and second or higher order births in the years 2012-2030 will be 5% and 
10% lower than the parity-specific cohort TFR, due to the fertility tempo effects. The 
overall TFR (all parities combined and rural/urban combined) in 2012 and 2030 will be   12
1.89 and 1.83, respectively. We assume that the increase in the age at childbearing will 
cease after year 2030, and by the year 2035, the period TFR will be the same as the 
cohort TFR and will remain constant thereafter(see Table 1).  
---Table 1 is about here --- 
       We conduct eight scenarios with different combinations of Medium Fertility, Low 
Fertility, Medium Mortality and Low Mortality, and minimum age of retirement.  In the 
scenarios of “gradual increase in minimum age of retirement” (scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4), 
we assume that the minimum age of retirement will increase from 60 and 55 for men and 
women in 2000-2006, to 65 and 63 for men and women in 2030, 66 and 65 for men and 
women in 2050, and 67 for both men and women in 2080 (see Table 2). The “constant 
minimum age of retirement” in scenarios 5, 6, 7, 8 assumes the minimum age of 
retirement remains constant at the current level of age 60 and 55 for men and women. 
1. Medium Fertility & Medium Mortality and a gradual increase in the minimum age of 
retirement; 
2. Medium Fertility & Low Mortality and a gradual increase in the minimum age of 
retirement; 
3. Low Fertility & Medium Mortality and a gradual increase in minimum age of 
minimum age of retirement; 
4. Low Fertility & Low Mortality and a gradual increase in the minimum age of 
retirement; 
5. Medium Fertility & Medium Mortality and a constant minimum age of retirement; 
6. Medium Fertility & Low Mortality and a constant minimum age of retirement; 
7. Low Fertility & Medium Mortality and a constant minimum age of retirement;   13
8. Low Fertility & Low Mortality and a constant minimum age of retirement. 
-- Table 2 is about here --- 
                   
The impacts of a gradual increase in minimum age at retirement on pension deficit 
         The results of this study show that the pension deficit as percent of GDP in the 
scenarios of a gradual increase in minimum age of retirement (Figure 1 and Table 3) will 
be largely reduced as compared to the scenarios of constant minimum age of retirement 
(Figure 2 and Table 3), under any combination of medium fertility, low fertility, medium 
mortality, and low mortality. In the cases of Medium Fertility & Medium Mortality, 
which generally represents our educational guess of the future demographic changes, the 
pension deficit as percent of GDP under the assumption of a gradual increase in the 
minimum age of retirement will steadily decrease from 0.82% in 2000 to 0.45%, -0.06%, 
-0.48% in 2010, 2020, 2030, and then remain at a very low level with some fluctuations. 
In the other three less likely scenarios of Medium Fertility & Low Mortality, Low 
Fertility & Medium Mortality, Low Fertility & Low Mortality, gradual increases in 
minimum age of retirement will also lead to steady decreases in pension deficit as percent 
of GDP, negative percent (pension fund surpluses) in 2020 and 2030, and then increase 
but still remain at rather low level up to 2050-60. 
 ---Figure 1 and Figure 2 are about here--- 
              However,  if  China  keeps  its  current  very  low  minimum  age  of  retirement 
unchanged in the long run, the pension deficit as percent of GDP will steadily and 
quickly increase in all cases of different combinations of fertility and mortality levels. 
Under the more likely Medium Fertility & Medium Mortality demographic regime, a   14
constant minimum age of retirement will lead to a pension deficit increase from 0.82% of 
GDP in 2000 to 1.83%, 2.92%, and 3.73% of GDP in 2030, 2050, and 2080, in contrast 
to pension fund surpluses in 2020-2050 and around 0.3% thereafter in the scenario of a 
gradual increase in the minimum age of retirement with exactly the same demographic 
assumptions. In the other less likely demographic regimes, the pension deficit will be 
even much higher under the constant minimum age of retirement assumption: 1.96-2.07%, 
3.54-4.62%, and 4.72-8.95% of GDP in 2030, 2050, and 2080, respectively. 
 --Table 3 and Table 4 are bout here--    
           In addition to the institutional and management problems in the current Chinese 
pension system, the very low minimum age of retirement (60 for men and 55 for women), 
which is indeed far from international standard, is one of the main causes of the current 
difficulties of pension funds in China. Our projection exercise indicates that China needs 
to revise its current policy concerning age at retirement, because if it were not revised, 
the pension deficit as percent of GDP will increase quickly to an unacceptable level under 
the various scenarios of demographic regimes. Our study also reveals that the current 
very low minimum age of retirement in China actually provides a good opportunity to 
face the challenges of pension fund deficits through gradually increasing the minimum 
age of retirement. Gradual increases in the minimum age of retirement plus viable 
reforms in pension system management will help China to move away from the 
difficulties of pension funds deficits. On the other hand, an increase in the minimum age 
of retirement, may reduce the job opportunities for younger people. Such possible 
negative effects may be avoided or reduced through investing more in job-creating 
businesses, especially in service industries, and prolonging the education period of young   15
people. We believe that young people’s job opportunities should not be used as a 
justification to keep the Chinese minimum age of retirement at the current very low level.  
 
Impacts of the demographic changes on pension deficit 
             Comparing the four curves in Figure 1 and the four columns in Table 3, we can 
quantify the impacts of the possible demographic changes on the pension deficit as 
percent of GDP under the assumption of a gradual increase in the minimum age of 
retirement. Under the assumption of a gradual increase in the minimum age of retirement, 
the pension deficit as percent of GDP in the four scenarios with different combinations of 
fertility and mortality levels will not differ significantly up to the year 2030; the 
differences will increasingly become larger after 2030: the pension deficit as percent of 
GDP in the low fertility scenarios will be 5.5-11.1, 3.8-6.3, and 9.0-13.8 times as high as 
that in the Medium Fertility & Medium Mortality scenarios. This exercise shows that the 
impact of possible mortality changes on pension deficit as percent of GDP is likely 
moderate, but the negative impacts of keeping the very low fertility rate (which 
corresponds with keeping the current very rigid fertility control policy unchanged in the 
long-term) will be very large, especially after 2030 (see Table 3 and Table 4). 
           Under the assumption of a constant minimum age of retirement, the directions of 
the relative differences in pension deficit as percent of GDP among the four scenarios of 
different combinations of the fertility and mortality levels are similar to that under the 
assumption of a gradual increase in the minimum age of retirement; however, the pension 
deficit as percent of GDP in all of the four scenarios are, too high, especially in the   16
scenarios with low fertility: 6-13%, 34-58%, and 97-140% higher than in the scenario 
with medium fertility and medium mortality in 2030, 2050, and 2080, respectively. 
 
Conclusion 
           This article derives a simple formula for projecting the pension deficit as percent 
of GDP in future years based on commonly available existing population forecasting and 
a few predictable economic and policy variables. Compared with the classic basic 
equilibrium equation of pension funds (Eq. (1)), our new formula basically decomposes 
the retirees-workers ratio (d(t)) into three variables d2(t), r(t) and e(t). The retirees-
workers ratio (d(t)) mixes the impacts of demographics, prevalence of pension coverage, 
and economic performance, which makes it extremely difficult to predict d(t) into the 
future years. Our new formula decomposes the hardly-predictable d(t) into three more-
easily-predictable variables --   2() dt  (dependent ratio of elderly over minimum age of 
retirement), r(t) (prevalence of pension coverage) and e(t) (formal employment rate).  
         The illustrative application to China shows that the pension deficit as percent of 
GDP in the scenarios of gradual increases in the minimum age of retirement will be 
largely reduced as compared to the scenarios of a constant minimum age of retirement, 
under any combinations of medium fertility, low fertility, medium mortality, and low 
mortality. In situations of Medium Fertility & Medium Mortality, which generally 
represents our educational guess of the future demographic changes in China, the pension 
deficit as percent of GDP under the assumption of a gradual increase in minimum age of 
retirement will steadily decrease from 0.82% in 2000 to 0.45%, -0.06%, -0.48% in 2010, 
2020, 2030, and then remain at a very low level with some fluctuations. In contrast, under   17
exactly the same assumptions of Medium Fertility & Medium Mortality, keeping the 
minimum age of minimum age of retirement constant at the current level will lead to a 
pension deficit increase from 0.82% of GDP in 2000 to 1.83%, 2.92%, and 3.73% of 
GDP in 2030, 2050, and 2080.  
         Our projection exercise indicates that China needs to revise its current policy 
concerning age at retirement, because if it were not revised, the pension deficit as percent 
of GDP will increase quickly to an unacceptable level under various scenarios of 
demographic regimes. Gradual increases in the minimum age of retirement plus viable 
reforms for pension system management will help China to move away from the 
difficulties of pension fund deficits. On the other hand, however, increases in the 
minimum age of retirement may reduce the job opportunities for younger people. Such 
possible negative effects may be avoided or reduced through investing more in job-
creating businesses, especially in service industries, and prolonging the education period 
of young persons. 
        Under the assumption of a gradual increase in the minimum age of retirement, the 
pension deficit as percent of GDP in the four scenarios with different combinations of the 
fertility and mortality levels will not differ significantly up to 2030; the differences will 
increasingly become much larger after 2030: the pension deficit as percent of GDP in the 
low fertility scenarios (keeping the current very rigid fertility control policy unchanged in 
the long-term) will be 5.6-11.1, 3.8-6.3, and 9.0-13.8 times as high as in the Medium 
Fertility & Medium Mortality scenario in 2040, 2060, and 2080, respectively. The 
exercise shows that the impact of possible mortality changes on the pension deficit as 
percent of GDP is likely moderate.   18
      Although  the  simple  method  proposed  in this article may be used to accurately 
forecast the pension deficit as percent of GDP in the short run-- if accurate input 
parameters of demographics, retirement and social welfare policies and formal 
employment rates can be accurately predicted-- the illustrative application to China 
presented in this article is not intended for accurate forecasting. This is because the 
assumptions adopted in the exercise for the 80 years projection horizon involve too many 
uncertainties. What we performed in this illustrative application is a “what if” exercise 
for policy analysis only and must not be interpreted as forecasting. For example, keeping 
the ratio of r(t)/e(t) constant is unrealistic, because the likely extension of the pension 
system from urban to rural areas, and further urbanization will certainly change the 
values of r(t) (retirement rate) and e(t) (formal employment rate). Perhaps in the early 
stages of the extension of the pension system from urban to rural areas, e(t) and P(t) will 
increase due to the increase in the rural pension premium contributors, thus reducing the 
pension deficit as percent of GDP; but in the later stages of the pension system expansion 
when the new rural contributors become eligible to receive pension benefits, r(t) will 
increase and thus will increase the pension deficit as percent of GDP. This again reveals 
that the very simple new formula proposed in this article can be used not only for policy 
analysis concerning minimum age of retirement and fertility as illustrated in this article, 
but also for policy analysis concerning expansion of the pension system from urban to 
rural areas.    
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1 A few actuarial models for pension deficit forecasts do not necessarily need the age-sex-
specific data. For example, Hamayon and Legros (2001) developed a demo-economic 
model by linking production functions and demographic change. Although their model 
focuses on addressing the problems and consequences of the introduction of a funded 
component into a PAYGO system, it could also be used to forecast the pension deficit. It 
requires more economic data as compared to the PROST and Becker and Paltsev (2001), 
but it does not need to break data down to age-sex-specific. The models for the defined 
benefit pension system based on time series stochastic rates of return might also be used 
to forecast the pension fund deficit. These kinds of models are relatively more 
complicated and need much more statistical knowledge on the rates of return, although 
only aggregated data are required (e.g., Bedard 1999; Cairns and Parker 1997; Haberman 
and Wong 1997), and thus they are not applied as widely as other models. 
 
 
2 Source: Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare;  
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db-hw/lifetb03/3.html 
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3 We present assumed life expectancy for both sexes and rural/urban combined in the text 
due to space limits, but we actually used the sex-specific life expectancies for rural and 
urban sectors, respectively, in our projection exercise.  
 
4 The fertility and mortality in rural and urban China differ substantially and thus we 
should distinguish rural and urban differentials and include the rural-urban migration, 
which is what we have done concerning the Chinese population projection using the 
ProFamy software for the research reported in this article. However, the pension fund 
deficit rates projection cannot be done separately for the rural and urban sectors because 
of the complication of rural-urban mobility;  the currently available methodology and 
data cannot deal with such complications. We, therefore, aggregate the forecasted rural 
and urban single-year-age-specific population and then estimate the pension deficit as 
percent of GDP for the country as a whole. Note that in limited areas with advanced 
economics, such as in the suburban areas of some cities in the east coast areas, the rural 
and urban residents are integrated in one uniform pension system. In many other rural 
areas, pension systems either do not exist or are still pilot programs, which are not yet 
integrated with the urban pension system which were established in the1950s. We assume 
that the future development of the rural pension scheme will be integrated with the urban 
pension system, since there is no good reason to further develop a separate pension 
system for rural areas.   
 
5 Various provinces in China have already started to gradually relax the one-child policy, 
such as allowing couples who are only-one-child (either both parties or one party) to have 
two children. 
 
6 Considering the relatively low level of socioeconomic development in rural areas and 
the fact that rural couples of minority ethnic groups are allowed to have more than 2 
children, the lifetime cohort TFR in rural areas in and after the year 2012 is assumed to 
be 2.27. We assume that the lifetime cohort TFR in urban areas will be 1.8 in and after 
the year 2012, which implies that we assume that in urban areas 3% of women are in-
fecund, and 14% voluntarily choose to have only one child.  Table 1. Rural and urban period TFR, and weighted average period TFR of rural and 
urban combined (using % of rural and urban as weights) 
 
  2000  2012  2030  2035  2050  2080 
Low fertility           
Rural  1.9  1.98  1.98  1.98  1.98  1.98 















Medium fertility           
Rural  1.9  2.09  2.09  2.27  2.27  2.27 
















(1) In both low and medium fertility scenarios, we assume that the proportion of the 
urban population will increase from 36% in 2000 to 47.4%%, 61.7%, 75%, and 90% in 
2012, 2030, 2050, and 2080, respectively. 
(2) Figures in the parentheses are the TFR adjusted for the effects of increasing mean age 
at birth, by the Bongaarts-Feeney method. When the increase in mean age at birth ceases, 
the tempo adjustment is zero. 
 
Table 2. Assumption of minimum age of retirement 
 2000  2006  2030  2050  2080 
Gender  male female male female male female male female male female 
Gradual increase in 
minimum age of 
retirement 
60  55 60  55 65  63 66  65 67  67 
constant minimum 
age of retirement 
60  55 60  55 60  55 60  55 60  55 
 Table 3. Projected pension deficit as percent of GDP and the pension deficit (100 million 
RMB) with value compatible to 2001 in the scenarios with gradual increase in minimum 
age of retirement and different demographic regimes 
         MF&MM         MF & LM          LF & MM           LF & LM 
      Pension deficit   Pension deficit    Pension deficit    Pension deficit 
  
   
%GDP 
RMB 
(100m)    %GDP 
RMB 
(100m)    %GDP 
RMB 
(100m)    %GDP 
RMB 
100m) 
2000 89468 0.82 735 0.82 735 0.82 735 0.82 735
2010 182031 0.45 819 0.45 828 0.45 819 0.45 828
2020 310935 -0.06 -198 -0.03 -92 -0.06 -195 -0.03 -92
2030 494549 -0.48 -2385 -0.38 -1898 -0.43 -2134 -0.33 -1641
2040 732053 0.05 350 0.30 2193 0.26 1938 0.53 3893
2050 1032634 -0.16 -1639 0.32 3268 0.27 2743 0.79 8197
2060 1456632 0.33 4869 1.03 14982 1.26 18364 2.10 30606
2070 2054723 0.32 6505 1.07 21933 1.85 38086 2.87 59030
2080 2898390 0.23 6756 0.98 28260 2.09 60654 3.21 93078
Notes: (1) MF&MM: Medium Fertility & Medium Mortality; MF&LM: Medium 
Fertility & Low Mortality; LF&MM: Low Fertility & Medium Mortality; LF&LM: Low 
Fertility & Low Mortality; (2) RMB 100m: 100 million RMB; RMB is the Chinese 
currency; current I US dollar is equal to about 8.1 RMB. 
  
Table 4. Projected pension deficit as percent of GDP and the pension deficit (100 million 
RMB) with value compatible to 2001 in the scenarios with constant minimum age of 
retirement as it was in 2000 and different demographic regimes 
         MF&MM         MF & LM          LF & MM           LF & LM 
      Pension deficit   Pension deficit    Pension deficit    Pension deficit 
  
   
%GDP 
RMB 
(100m)    %GDP 
RMB 
(100m)    %GDP 
RMB 




2000 89468 0.82 735 0.82 735 0.82 735 0.82 735
2010 182031 0.80 1459 0.81 1467 0.80 1459 0.81 1467
2020 310935 1.06 3299 1.10 3416 1.06 3299 1.10 3420
2030 494549 1.83 9038 1.96 9673 1.94 9591 2.07 10242
2040 732053 2.24 16429 2.56 18709 2.66 19463 2.99 21910
2050 1032634 2.92 30155 3.54 36601 3.91 40337 4.62 47709
2060 1456632 3.39 49330 4.28 62402 5.41 78778 6.55 95451
2070 2054723 3.34 68700 4.30 88435 6.12 125796 7.50 154103
2080 2898390 3.73 108072 4.72 136702 7.35 212997 8.95 259305
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Figure 1. Pension deficit as % of GDP of scenarios with gradual 
increase in minimum age of retirement, and different combinations of 
Medium Fertility, Low Fertility, Medium Mortality and Low Mortality 
assumptions 
 
Figure 2. Pension deficit as % of GDP of scenarios with constant 
minimum age of retirement as it was in 2000 and different 
combinations of Medium Fertility, Low Fertility, Medium Mortality 
and Low Mortality assumptions 